

# CLASSIC REPRINTS

## *An Introduction to Early Greek Philosophy*

The Chief Fragments and Ancient Testimony,  
with Connecting Commentary

John Mansley Robinson

an exact reproduction of the text  
originally published in 1968

reprinted with kind permission from  
the estate of John Mansley Robinson

ISBN print 978-1-938421-61-7

ISBN e-book 978-1-938421-62-4



Advanced Reasoning Forum  
P. O. Box 635  
Socorro, NM 87801 USA  
[www.ARFbooks.org](http://www.ARFbooks.org)



## PREFACE

WHITEHEAD observes somewhere that "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." The judgment is sweeping but sound, and it is confirmed by the practice of making the study of Plato central to most college and university courses in the history of ancient philosophy.

But (to adapt a phrase of Newton's) if Plato saw further than most men it was because he stood on the shoulders of giants. Anaximander, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Democritus — these were the men who laid the foundations and filled out the framework of Greek philosophy. The problems Plato faced were problems they had created, and the fund of general ideas at his disposal for dealing with these problems he inherited from them. It is in his struggle with these recalcitrant materials that the depth and power of Plato's philosophical genius is most strikingly revealed.

This is partially understood; yet the great figures of early Greek philosophy are rarely studied as they ought to be, and for good reason. Of the works they produced not one has survived intact; what firsthand knowledge of their contents we possess we owe to later writers who quote from them. Where even these remains are wanting we are forced to rely upon secondhand, late, and often unreliable reports of them. These accounts form a mass of material difficult to assess and difficult to interpret; around it has grown up a formidable body of highly specialized and technical literature. This being so, it is no great wonder if the average instructor hurries over this material as quickly as decency permits in order to reach the firmer ground provided by the dialogues of Plato.

Yet the problem of dealing with it is not an impossible one. It is, in large part, a question of ordering the material — of presenting it as the record of a concerted attempt to answer certain fundamental questions. This is the point of view from which I have set myself to write this book. The student will find in it the materials upon which any understanding of early Greek philosophy must be based; but he will find them presented in the form of a continuously unfolding process of thought.

I will first say a word about the evidence and then about the principles of interpretation I have followed. The evidence on which our knowledge

of early Greek philosophy is based is of two sorts: there are the fragments (the words of the early philosophers themselves), and there are the reports of the philosophers' teaching which we find in later writers. These two sorts of evidence are of very unequal value. The testimony of later writers is almost always unsatisfactory; none of it has the authority of the fragments themselves. I have tried, therefore, to work from the fragments as far as possible, and to include as many of these as I could.

In earlier thinkers the lack of firsthand evidence presents a serious problem. In Anaximander's case we have part of a single sentence (there is no agreement as to how much of it is Anaximander's) and two or three doubtful phrases to go by. In such a case we have no choice but to fall back on later testimony. It is not, in fact, until we come to Heraclitus that we have any considerable number of fragments to work with. But from this point on the reader will find that I have tried, so far as possible, to dispense with secondary materials (except for purposes of illustration) and to argue directly from the fragments themselves. They are, after all, our primary source of knowledge of early Greek philosophy.

To help the student distinguish the fragments from other materials the former have been printed in boldface type. All materials have been assigned numbers, and the source from which each is taken has been indicated in the list of references at the back of the book. The student who cares to make use of this list in the light of the Note which precedes it will find that he is able to exercise some slight control over my weighting of the evidence.

With one or two exceptions these materials have been translated afresh. This was not necessary; most of them already exist in good English translations, and the extent of my debt to these translations will be all too obvious to those familiar with them. The labor was undertaken for my own good, to force myself to come to grips with problems arising from the texts themselves. I quickly found the truth of the saying that translations are like women: the beautiful ones are not faithful, and the faithful ones are not beautiful. For the most part I have sacrificed beauty to faithfulness. If I have taken occasional liberties with the texts of Plato or Aristotle, I have held my hand in the case of the fragments. Here I have tried to preserve, rather than to remove, all significant ambiguity. Except as noted in the list of references, I have followed the readings of Diels-Kranz for the fragments and the doxographic tradition, and those of the various editors of the Loeb Classical Library texts for other authors.

It is impossible, of course, to translate without interpreting; so it is only right that I should say something about the principles of interpretation which I have followed in this book. I am not speaking of the

interpretation of particular fragments, or even of particular authors. There is scarcely a passage of any importance in Parmenides, for example, which scholars would interpret the same way. If I have avoided all reference to such problems of interpretation it is not because I am unaware of them, or because I do not think them important, but because they seem to me to be out of place in a book for beginners. The student who is curious to see for himself what goes into the interpretation of a Greek text will discover what he is looking for in the Bibliographical Essay to be found at the end of the book.

I have consulted few specialist studies during the actual writing of this book. I wished to write directly from the texts themselves, and with the student, not the scholar, in mind. In doing so I have had two things forcibly impressed upon me. The first is the unity of Greek philosophy. The Greek philosophers addressed themselves to a single set of closely connected philosophical problems, they approached these problems from certain assumptions held in common, and they employed in their solution a limited range of philosophical ideas. I believe that this fact is of the greatest importance for philosophers. I do not think that anyone who has thought very long or hard about metaphysical problems can fail to realize in the end that the framework within which we think about these problems is Greek. Nor do I think any attempt to go behind that framework has much chance of succeeding if it does not begin by recognizing this fact.

Secondly, I have been impressed by the developmental aspect of Greek philosophy. The general framework within which the Greek philosophers worked may be said to have been established by Anaximander at the very beginning. But the exploration of that framework, the realization of the problems inherent in it, and the attempt to solve them was the work of successive generations of philosophers. This development took place at an astonishing rate during the period dealt with in this book; nor is it clear that it has even yet come to an end. These two convictions — of the unity and of the development of Greek philosophy — do not admit of summary proof; but it is only proper to say that they have left their mark everywhere upon the final form of this book.

Above all I have tried to make a book that would be useful to beginners. If any reader cares to suggest ways in which it can be made more useful still, I shall be grateful.

J.M.R.

*Newfane Hill*  
*Newfane, Vermont*



# CONTENTS

PREFACE vi

*Part One* THE LAYING OF THE FOUNDATIONS

<i>Chapter</i> 1	Hesiod	3
2	Anaximander	23
3	Anaximenes and Xenophanes	41
4	Pythagoreanism	57

*Part Two* THE POSING OF THE PROBLEM

5	Heraclitus	87
6	Parmenides	107
7	Zeno and Melissus	127

*Part Three* THREE SOLUTIONS

8	Empedocles	151
9	Anaxagoras	175
10	Atomism: The Macrocosm	195
11	Atomism: The Microcosm	215

*Part Four* THE UNSEATING OF ZEUS

12	Protagoras, Antiphon, and Callicles	239
13	Reaction	257
	Epilogue	285
	APPENDIX A. Thales of Miletus	291
	APPENDIX B. Gorgias <i>On Nature</i>	295
	BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY	299
	NOTE ON THE SOURCES	309
	REFERENCES	313
	INDEX	330
	MAPS	
	The Aegean	340-341
	Southern Italy and Sicily	342



# Heraclitus

The Ionians had taken as the starting point of their inquiry the visible world-order. Their aim was to understand this order: to determine its origin and the laws of its functioning. Even Pythagoras, who subordinated this inquiry to the freeing of the soul from its bondage to the body, did not radically alter the nature of the inquiry itself. It revolved still around the same center: the cosmos, the visible embodiment of reason.

This unanimity of approach was shattered, early in the fifth century B.C., by the appearance of Parmenides (Chapter Six). The methods Parmenides used, and the conclusions he reached, were so utterly opposed to those of the Ionians as to suggest a complete break with the whole tradition. Yet the *problem* with which Parmenides was concerned — the problem of “the one and the many” — grew out of the Ionian tradition in the most natural way, and the first to concern himself with it was himself an Ionian, Parmenides’ predecessor Heraclitus.

Heraclitus was a native of Ephesus, midway between Colophon and Miletus. Around 500 B.C. he produced a book of which well over a hundred fragments have come down to us. The tone of these fragments is striking; they reveal a proud and passionate nature, harsh in judgment, impatient of the views of others, yet redeemed by a clear, intense, and profoundly religious vision of reality.

## THE REJECTION OF POPULAR RELIGION

Heraclitus gives short shrift to his predecessors and contemporaries:

**5.1** A knowledge of many things does not teach one to have intelli-

gence; otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, or again Xenophanes and Hecataeus.

- 5.2** Wisdom is one thing: to understand the thought which steers all things through all things.

There is a fragment of the Greek poet Archilochus which runs:

- 5.3** The fox knows many things, the hedgehog only one. One big one.

Heraclitus is a hedgehog. To know many things — to know the causes of thunder and lightning and earthquakes — is good; but it is better to understand the one thing which underlies all of these — the thought that steers all things through all things. *This* is wisdom.

On the other hand, Heraclitus clearly owed more to Xenophanes than **5.1** would indicate, and nowhere is this more evident than in what he has to say of the religious conceptions and practices of his fellowmen:

- 5.4** The one and only wisdom is willing and unwilling to be called Zeus.

The wisdom of which Heraclitus speaks here is the "totality of mind and thought" which Xenophanes calls "god" (**3.40**); it is the intelligence which steers all things through all things. To the extent that it is divine it is willing to be called "Zeus," since this is the name that all men give to the divine. But it is also unwilling; and this unwillingness — the unwillingness of Heraclitus himself to invoke the name of Zeus — springs from a rejection of the anthropomorphic conceptions which it conjures up in men's minds:

- 5.5** The secret rites which are in use among men are celebrated in an unholy manner.

- 5.6** For if it were not in honor of Dionysus that they hold their processions and sing their hymn to the male organ they would be acting most shamelessly.

- 5.7** Though defiled with blood they purify themselves with blood — as though a man who had stepped in mud were to wash it off with



mud. Such a man would be thought insane by anyone who saw him acting in this way. And they pray to these statues, as if a man were to talk to a house, not realizing what gods and heroes are.

The first two passages refer to rites associated with the mysteries of Dionysus, the third to those connected with the worship of the Olympian gods. Heraclitus condemns them without distinction, and the grounds on which he condemns them are familiar to us from Xenophanes; they are not only immoral, but they betray a complete misconception of the nature of the divine.

Hence Heraclitus' unwillingness to call the thought that steers all things "Zeus." Instead he chooses the fiery thunderbolt, which in Hesiod (and in Greek tradition generally) is the attribute of Zeus and the symbol of his might (1.2), to symbolize the divine:

**5.8** Thunderbolt steers all things.

THE WORLD-ORDER AS A FLUX

If we approach Heraclitus from the side of the world-order, the influence of Xenophanes is still more marked:

**5.9** Heraclitus describes change as a way up and down, and the world-order as coming into being in accordance with it. For fire, when it is contracted, becomes moist; when it is contracted still further it becomes water; and water, when it is contracted, turns to earth. This is the downward way. And earth liquifies again; and from it water arises; and from water the rest. For he refers nearly everything to the evaporation of the sea. And this is the upward way.

The process described in these lines is a familiar one; it is the process of dilation and compression by means of which Anaximenes brings about the transformations of air. But it is due to Xenophanes' influence that the process is so clearly conceived as a cyclical one, in which the evaporation of water from the sea is balanced by its return in the form of rain.

What is peculiar to Heraclitus is the sheer sweep of his vision of the world-order as a dynamic equilibrium of these opposite movements:

**5.10** All things come into being through opposition, and all are in flux like a river.

**5.11** Cool things become warm; what is warm cools; what is wet dries out; what is dry becomes moist.

In both Anaximander and Anaximenes (though perhaps more explicitly in the latter) the life of the world-order lies in continual movement; "for the things that change would not do so unless there were motion" (3.2). Heraclitus expresses the same idea in an arresting image:

**5.12** This world-order, the same for all, no god made or any man, but it always was and is and will be an ever-living fire, kindling by measure and going out by measure.

The mechanism of dilation and compression is such that it does not matter, from a metaphysical point of view, which element is taken as fundamental: earth, air, water, or fire. One will do as well as another; for it is as easy, given earth as fundamental, to derive air from it as to derive earth from air. Anaximenes had fixed on air simply as having no character peculiar to itself "when it is most evenly distributed" (3.2). Heraclitus fastens on fire because it *does* have a peculiar characteristic; that of perpetual motion. It is this which fits it to serve as a symbol of the cosmic process as a whole. To express in a single image the involved movement of men massed in battle on the plain of Troy, Homer says that "they fought in the image of blazing fire." For the same reason Heraclitus likens the warring of the opposites, the process of becoming, to a vast conflagration in which the whole forever consumes and renews itself.

In another image he likens the world-order to a posset — a drink made of ground barley, grated cheese and wine:

**5.13** Even the posset separates if it is not stirred.

For if it is not stirred, the ingredients quickly separate out, and the posset as such ceases to exist. So it is with the world-order; if the perpetual transformations of fire were to cease, becoming would fail and with it the world-order itself.

But the image with which Heraclitus' name has come to be associated in men's minds is that of 5.10, where the world-order is likened to a river:

**5.14** Heraclitus, you know, says that everything moves on and that nothing is at rest; and, comparing existing things to the flow

of a river, he says that you could not step into the same river twice.

You cannot step into the same river twice, because nothing is the same from one moment to the next. The waters into which you stepped but a moment ago have been carried away down the stream, and fresh waters have taken their place. So in the world-order the transformations of fire succeed one another continually, and nothing stands still.

The simile is an apt one, but in the form in which it is stated in 5.14 it is misleading. In this passage Plato makes Heraclitus say that you cannot step into the same *river* twice; but what Heraclitus actually says is:

**5.15** Upon those who step into the same rivers flow other and yet other waters.

In this version the *waters* are different but the *rivers* are the same. In the midst of change they preserve their identity. They change, yet they remain the same; for there are always fresh waters flowing on to take the place of those which have gone before. So it is in the world-order as a whole; in the midst of change the everlasting fire remains one and the same, "kindling in measure and going out in measure."

#### MEASURE AND JUSTICE

The kindlings and goings-out of fire are simply the transformations of the upward and downward ways:

**5.16** The changes of fire: first sea, and of sea half is earth, half fiery thunderbolt . . . Earth is dispersed as sea, and is measured out in the same proportion as before it became earth.

**5.17** All things are an exchange for fire, and fire for all things; as goods are for gold, and gold for goods.

The transformation of sea into earth is balanced by an equal and opposite transformation of earth into sea, the equilibrium of the whole being preserved by means of the equality of these exchanges, exactly as wares are exchanged for gold and gold for wares.

What is essential to maintaining this equilibrium is the observance of measure:

- 5.18** The sun will not overstep his measures; for if he does, the Furies, defenders of Justice, will find him out.

If the sun were to fail to turn back at the time of summer or winter solstice, the succession of the seasons would be disrupted and the whole natural order thrown out of balance. The avenging of all such violations of the natural order is the task of Furies. When the horses of Achilles prophesy his doom in Book 19 of the *Iliad*, it is the Furies who bid them be silent; it is not right that horses should talk. Neither is it right that the sun should overstep the limits set for it. The preservation of the whole requires the observance of measure in all things.

These ideas plainly go back to Anaximander. But Anaximander regards the destruction of one of the opposites by another as a kind of injustice. Heraclitus sees such destruction differently. The injustices of which Anaximander speaks are part and parcel of the cosmic process itself; without them there would be no alternation of winter and summer. The injustices which the opposites commit against each other are as essential to the well-being of the whole as the reparation which they make to one another. In the eyes of god, therefore, they are not injustices at all; for their occurrence is necessary to the functioning of the whole:

- 5.19** To god all things are beautiful and good and just; but men suppose some things to be just and others unjust.

The debt to Xenophanes is evident. Men can only know things through their opposites; this necessity is laid upon them by the nature of perception itself:

- 5.20** According to Anaxagoras [Chapter Nine] and Heraclitus, sensation proceeds by opposition. . . . In their view perception involves change, and a thing is not affected by what is like it, but only by what is unlike it. On this they base their belief; and they hold that what occurs in the case of touch bears them out. For when a thing is the same temperature as our body we do not feel it [as hot or cold].

Because of this fact all human knowledge is limited to the perception of contrast. But god is not bound by the laws of perception; "he sees all over, thinks all over, hears all over" (3.36). He is able, therefore, to perceive all things as they are in themselves, and seen from this point of view all things are just, for all are necessary — both the things that men think just and those that they think unjust.

The poets, in their ignorance, think that strife is unjust; but it is not:

- 5.21** Heraclitus rebukes Homer for saying, "Would that strife might perish from among gods and men!" He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the whole; for if his prayers were heard, all things would pass away . . . .
- 5.22** It is necessary to understand that war is universal and justice is strife, and that all things take place in accordance with strife and necessity.
- 5.23** For fire lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of air, and earth that of water.
- 5.24** War is the father and king of all . . . .

Not only Homer but Hesiod, too, rails against strife, saying that fishes devour one another because they do not have justice (1.16). But he fails to see that if fishes were not eaten by other fishes, and these by other fishes again, the balance of life in the sea would be completely disrupted. This is true not merely of living things but of the cosmic process as a whole; for the life of the cosmos is motion and change, and it is war that stirs the posset, war that brings about the perishing of sea that earth may live, and the other transformations of fire. Because it is the mainspring of the world-process, war is the father of all things and king of all. It has, in fact, assumed the titles of Zeus, fountainhead of all justice. War, too, is justice; in the eyes of god what men call "injustice" and what they call "justice" are one and the same.

#### THE "IDENTITY" OF THE OPPOSITES

The identity which underlies all opposition is insisted upon again and again in the fragments:

- 5.25** Sea water is very pure and very impure; drinkable and healthful for fishes, but undrinkable and destructive to men.
- 5.26** The path traced by the pen is straight and crooked.
- 5.27** In a circle, beginning and end are common.

The path which the pen traces across the page is crooked if you attend to the individual letters; but it is straight if you attend to the whole. In constructing a circle, the same point which serves as the beginning also serves as the end. The writing is both crooked and straight; the point, both beginning and end. In all of these examples the intention is the same: to illustrate the paradox of sameness in difference.

In the whole all opposition is transcended:

- 5.28** The god is day, night, winter, summer, war, peace, satiety, hunger, and undergoes change as fire, when it is mingled with spices, is named according to the aroma of each.

Even as the same fire, mingled with different spices, appears to us now as pleasant, now as unpleasant, so the god appears to us now as justice, now as injustice, now as life, now as death, but remains the same. To grasp this unity amid change is to grasp the fact that as it is the same river that flows towards us and recedes from us, so it is the same universal fire which in measure kindles and in measure goes out:

- 5.29** The way up and the way down are the same.

### THE *Logos*

There are few men capable of grasping this:

- 5.30** For the many do not understand such things when they meet with them; nor having learned do they comprehend, though they think they do.

- 5.31** Though the *logos* is as I have said, men always fail to comprehend it, both before they hear it and when they hear it for the first time. For though all things come into being in accordance with this *logos*, they seem like men without experience, though in fact they do have experience both of words and deeds such as I have set forth, distinguishing each thing in accordance with its nature and declaring what it is. But other men are as unaware of what they do when awake as they are when they are asleep.

- 5.32** Though they are in daily contact with the *logos* they are at variance with it, and what they meet with appears alien to them.

*Logos* can mean many things in Greek. It is derived from a verb meaning "to speak," and may refer simply to the words used by a speaker. But it may also refer to the thought expressed by what is said, conceived as existing in its own right apart from the words of the speaker. This is the sense in which Heraclitus uses it when he says:

**5.33** Listening not to me but to the *logos*, it is wise to acknowledge that all things are one.

The *logos* to which he refers here is clearly thought of as having an independent existence, and **5.31** confirms this impression: the *logos* is that in accordance with which all things come into being. It is in fact "the thought that steers all things through all things" (**5.2**).

Though the *logos* confronts men at every turn, they do not grasp it but behave like men asleep, unaware of what goes on about them:

**5.34** To those who are awake the world-order is one, common to all; but the sleeping turn aside each into a world of his own.

**5.35** We ought not to act and speak like men asleep.

**5.36** We ought to follow what is common to all; but though the *logos* is common to all, the many live as though their thought were private to themselves.

Just as men who are asleep turn aside in dreams from the world which is common to all into private worlds of their own, so men who are awake turn aside from the *logos* which is common to all into private worlds of their own. For "each forms his own opinion," as Xenophanes says (**3.46**), and each is pleased to think this opinion "his." But the truth does not lie in private judgment; it transcends opinion, and is the same for all. Its unity is grounded in the unity of the *logos* itself, in accordance with which all things take place.

But though the *logos* is common to all, knowledge of it is hard to acquire, for its features are ambiguous:

**5.37** If you do not expect the unexpected, you will not find it; for it is hard to find and difficult.

**5.38** Those who dig for gold dig up much dirt and find little.

This is only natural, for

**5.39** Nature loves to hide.

**5.40** The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks out nor conceals, but gives a sign.

**5.41** The Sibyl with raving mouth, uttering things mirthless, unadorned, and unperfumed, reaches down a thousand years with her voice because of the god.

Herodotus, in his *Histories*, relates that when Croesus, king of the Lydians, meant to march against the Persians, he sent to the oracle of Apollo at Delphi to inquire whether he should do so. The answer, delivered through the mouth of the Sibyl, was that if he did a great empire would fall. Croesus, encouraged, marched against the Persians, and it turned out as the oracle had prophesied — except that the empire was his own. In such dark riddles as these does the god speak: neither speaking out or concealing, but giving a sign.

The oracle through which he speaks to all men is sense perception:

**5.42** Those things of which there is sight, hearing, understanding, I esteem most.

But the deliverances of the senses are only “signs” which lead men astray unless they are correctly interpreted. When the intelligence sleeps, men fail to read them aright:

**5.43** Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men if they have souls that do not understand their language.

This is why the many are estranged from the *logos*, though it is common to all:

**5.44** They do not comprehend how, though it is at variance with itself, it agrees with itself. It is a harmony of opposed tensions, as in the bow and the lyre.

**5.45** In opposition there is agreement; between unlikes, the fairest harmony.



**5.46** The hidden harmony is stronger than the apparent.

In the bow as in the lyre there is an equilibrium of forces, the pull of the frame against the taut string being balanced by the pull of the string against the bent frame. The result is a harmony of opposed tensions such as we find in the world-order. For in the world-order this harmony is maintained by the equality of the transformations of fire. From the point of view of the senses the aggregation of these transformations is a many, a plurality of changes proceeding in opposite directions along the upward and downward ways, and therefore as filled with discord. But from the point of view of reason it is one, its unity consisting in the equilibrium maintained by the equivalence of the transformations of fire. The world-order is thus both a one and a many:

**5.47** Aggregations are wholes, yet not wholes; brought together, yet carried asunder; in accord, yet not in accord. From all, one; from one, all.

**5.48** Changing, it rests.

THE *Logos* IN MAN

To grasp the hidden connection that runs through all things and binds them together is to realize the impossibility of accepting some and rejecting others, of calling some "good" and others "bad." Men call those things "good" which they wish for themselves; but

**5.49** It is not good for men to get all they wish.

**5.50** It is sickness that makes health pleasant and good; hunger, satiety; weariness, rest.

**5.51** Physicians who cut, burn, stab, and rack the sick demand a fee for it.

**5.52** Beasts are driven to pasture with blows.

The cautery which the physician performs is painful; yet the physician demands a reward for it all the same, for by hurting the patient he makes

him well. The patient, insofar as he fails to understand this, is no better than an ox that resists the blows of the drover, not realizing that it is being driven to pasture.

In truth, the many are as far from understanding what happens to them as oxen are:

**5.53** It is not characteristic of men to be intelligent; but it is characteristic of god.

**5.54** Man is called childish in comparison with the divine, just as a child is in comparison with a man.

**5.55** Even the wisest of men appears to be but an ape in comparison with a god, both in wisdom and in beauty and in every other way.

Yet, as wide as the gap is between the human and the divine, the two are connected by a thread. For all men have a share in the intelligence by which all things are steered through all things:

**5.56** According to Heraclitus we become intelligent by drawing in the divine *logos* when we breathe. We become forgetful during sleep, but on waking we regain our senses. For in sleep the channels of perception are shut, and the intelligence in us is severed from its kinship with the environment — our only connection with it being through breathing, by which we are, as it were, rooted in it. When it is separated in this way, the mind loses the power of remembering which it formerly had; but in the waking state it once more flows forth through the channels of perception as through so many openings, and making contact with the environment recovers the power of reasoning.

Just as coals, when they are brought close to the fire, begin to glow, and die down when they are removed from it, so it is with that portion of the environment which sojourns in our own bodies. When it is separated from its source, it loses nearly all power of thought; but when it makes contact with it through the many channels of sense, it becomes of like nature to the whole.

It is for this reason that those who fail to perceive the one in the many are likened to sleepwalkers; for in sleep our contact with the *logos* is reduced to a minimum. But we can see, too, why we ought not to act and speak like men asleep (**5.35**); for all men breathe, and therefore all have a share of intelligence, however slight: